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Abstract:  
Turkey is one of the eight countries that currently have a corporate governance index for firms 
listed on its main stock exchange (Borsa Istanbul). As in the case of many emerging markets, the 
country’s business landscape is characterized by family owned conglomerates some of which 
have recently become a favorite target for foreign direct and portfolio investment. By using 
corporate governance data on 22 publicly traded Turkish companies we estimate the 
determinants of corporate governance ratings for these companies with a focus on ownership 
structure. Our results show that family ownership has a negative impact on corporate governance 
ratings while foreign ownership has a weak but positive effect.    
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has become as important a factor as financial performance in 
investment decisions recently. Recent financial scandals such as Enron and WorldCom 
illustrated how corporate governance can help avoid or minimize agency problems and the 
opportunistic behavior of managers. These scandals have served as justification for new 
legislation to regulate corporate governance practices such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Corporate Governance 
Principles, UK Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, and the Tabaksblat Code in the Netherlands . These types of 
regulations set new standards for corporate governance especially regarding selection and 
functions of board directors, senior executives in the case of the U.S. In emerging markets such 
regulations offer guidance on what rules may be adopted to satisfy the willingness of investors 
and potential investors. 
In parallel with the current practices worldwide in corporate governance, the Capital 
Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) established the Corporate Governance Principles in 2005. In 
doing so, regulations of many countries were examined including the “OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles” of 1999. The particular conditions of Turkey have been taken into 
consideration during the preparation of these principles. In Turkey, after Capital Market Board’s 
communiqué on Corporate Governance Ratings, Istanbul Stock Exchange
1
 published the rules of 
Corporate Governance Index -. The Principles consist of four main sections namely shareholders, 
disclosure and transparency, stakeholders and board of directors.  (Corporate Governance 
                                                          
1
 New name is Borsa Istanbul (BIST) since April, 2013. 
Principles, CMB, 2003: 7)
2
 Today, 46 Turkish companies are rated on their corporate 
governance practices. Corporate governance ranking is a new concept for Turkish firms. 
Although being listed in this index is optional, publicly-traded companies should be rated by 
agencies that hold a license issued by CMB and need to receive a rating of 7 or higher to be 
listed in the Corporate Governance index. In the first year following the implementation of the 
index in Turkey, there were only seven companies on Borsa Istanbul (BIST) that had corporate 
governance ratings (CGR); at the end of 2013 this number increased to 46 representing 11 % of 
all listed companies.  
 
  
                                                          
2
 The principles mainly address publicly held joint stock companies. It is considered that other joint stock companies and 
institutions, active in private and public sector, may also implement these Principles. The implementation of the Principles is 
optional. However, the explanation concerning the implementation status of the Principles, if not detailed reasoning thereof, 
conflicts arising from inadequate implementation of these Principles, and explanation on whether there is a plan for change in 
the company’s governance practices in the future should all be included in the annual report and disclosed to public. This part 
in annual reports are called as Corporate Governance Prıncıples Compliance Report.  Corporate Governance Principles that are 
adopted and not adopted by the company, reasons for not applying the principles and conflicts of interest resulting from not 
wholly adopting these principles are disclosed in this report. 
 
Box 1. Implementation of Corporate Governance Index in Turkey 
Implementation of CGI in Turkey 
In Turkey, after CMB’s communiqué on Corporate Governance Rating, BIST published the rules 
of CGI in February 2005. In August 2007, BIST launched the CGI with 5 companies,  an 
important step. As an incentive for companies to be listed on the index, the annual 
listing/registration fee is currently reduced by 50% for the first two years and by 25% for the 
following two years. Companies that remain on the index further than this period only pay 90% 
of the listing fee.  
Companies traded on Borsa İstanbul (except for the companies on the Watchlist, the Turkish 
equivalent of Pinksheet Stocks in in the US and C List) are rated by the five rating agencies 
licensed by the CMB. Evaluated companies need a minimum corporate governance rating of 7 
out of 10 as a whole and minimum of 6.5 for each evaluation category 
3
 to be able to be listed in 
Borsa Istanbul’s CGI.  If a company is rated by a rating agency more than once in a calendar 
year, the latest rating score is taken into consideration. In the case of cancellation of one rating 
agency’s rating license by CMB, the rating evaluations and scores are cancelled as well. 
Companies should reevaluate their rating scores every year in order to continue to be listed in 
the Index. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The main evaluation categories are shareholders, disclosure and transparency, stakeholders and board of directors. The 
weights are as follows: Shareholders 25%, Disclosure and Transparency 35%, Stakeholders 15%, Board of Directors 25%. 
Figure 1. Stock market Capitalization in Turkey as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source:  Worldbank, World Development Indicators
4
 
The implementation of a Corporate Governance Index holds a particular importance in 
the case of Turkey. As of 2012, the ratio of the market capitalization of stocks listed on Borsa 
Istanbul to the country’s GDP is  39.12%.  Although this figure is low compared to the European 
Union average of 42.85% and to the emerging markets average of 49.89%, the fact that it has 
grown from less than 20% in 2008 to the current level illustrates the significance. (See  Figure 
1).   
 
                                                          
4
 Market capitalization is calculated as the share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are 
the domestically incorporated companies listed on the county’s stock exchanges at the end of the year.Listed companies  does 
not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. 
Figure 2. Number of Firms in BIST and CGI 
 
Source: Worldbank and Borsa Istanbul 
5
 
When we compare Turkey’s progress in implementing CGR measures in relation to other 
emerging markets, we observe that Turkey is one of the leaders. Since 2001 only seven other 
stock exchanges around the world have launched corporate governance indexes besides Turkey:  
Brazil, China, Italy, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, and South Korea.  
 
  
                                                          
5
 Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of 
the year. Listed companies do not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. 
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Table 1. Number of Companies Listed In Corporate Governance Indices in the World 
Country Index Name 
Launch 
Date 
Original 
Constituents 
February 
2013 
Increase since 
launch date 
Brazil 
Special Corporate 
Governance Stock 
Index  
2001 12 174 162 
China 
Corporate 
Governance Index 
2008 199 266 67 
Italy FTSE Italia STAR 2001 20 66 46 
Mexico 
Indice IPC 
Sustentable 
2011 23 29 6 
Peru 
Good Corporate 
Governance Index 
2008 9 9 0 
South 
Africa 
Socially Responsible 
Investment Index 
2004 49 79 30 
South 
Korea 
Korean Corporate 
Governance Index  
2003 50 50 0 
Turkey 
Corporate 
Governance Index 
2007 7 46 39 
Source: The Table is derived from Grimminger and Benedetta (2013) World Bank/IFC study: 
Raising the Bar on Corporate Governance – A Study of Eight Stock Exchanges Indices 
 
In general, firms that receive corporate governance ratings get the opportunity to 
differentiate themselves in the marketplace especially in countries where corporate governance 
practices are weak. Incentives for better corporate governance practices would also attract 
foreign capital. Developing countries like Turkey need foreign capital to cover current account 
deficits. One of the most important safeguards for the foreign investors is the sound corporate 
governance practices in line with international standards.  Increasing foreign stake in local 
companies is usually encouraged by policy-makers due to the common notion that foreign 
ownership increases not only profitability but also accountability. The underlying assumption 
here is that foreign investors bring much-needed know-how and managerial skills to domestic 
companies and in return make them more efficient. Although the linkage has been studied in 
developed market economies, studies that focus on emerging market settings are rare.  Research 
on the effect of foreign ownership on corporate governance rating improvement in Turkey is still 
new; this paper contributes to the existing literature by evaluating the impact of foreign 
ownership on corporate governance in the case of Turkey.  
Another important contribution of this paper is to illustrate the impact of family 
ownership in corporate control in an emerging market setting like Turkey. Family-controlled 
groups of companies are a common characteristic of Turkish business scene. Existence of family 
control may not be a problem in countries with effective regulations and laws for protecting 
minority shareholders, but it may be a problem in developing countries. New generation of 
family-controlled companies in Turkey pay more attention to corporate governance to make sure 
their companies survive in such a competitive world. This new generation of family managers 
seems more aware of the importance of corporate governance practices. The four fundamental 
pillars of corporate governance (responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency) 
inevitably gain more importance for the new generation family members compared to their 
predecessors. The prevalence of strong families with controlling corporate stakes is not unique to 
Turkey. In many emerging market settings (i.e. Brazil, India) family owned conglomerates hold 
a significant share in the country’s business landscape.  By evaluating the impact of family 
control on corporate governance scores, we also seek to find out if family ownership leads to 
better or worse corporate governance outcomes.   
The outline of this paper is as follows: In the following section some of the earlier literature on 
corporate governance and ownership structure is introduced; in section 3 we describe our data 
and lay out our methodology; Section 4 provides the results of our estimations and Section 5 
concludes.   
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Empirical studies that evaluate determinants of CGR usually include firm specific financial 
measures    such as profitability and financial risk (i.e. Ananchotikul, 2009, Brown and Caylor 
2009, Larcker et al. 2007,   Abdullah and Page, 2009, Sami et. al, 2011).   
Profitability is usually measured by evaluating  return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) and earnings per share (Brown and Caylor, 2009,  Mashayekhi and Bazaz, 2008, 
Gompers et al. ,2003, Wu and Cui, 2002, Demsetz & Villalonga 2001, Gugler et al. 2004.) 
Gompers et al. (2003) show that better governed US firms have higher valuation but they find 
that performance indicator, ROE is an insignificant factor.  Core et al (2005) argue that ROA is a 
better measure compared to ROE and   find a significant relationship between corporate 
governance and this performance measure. Contrary to these results Brown and Caylor (2009) 
show that firms with relatively poor governance are relatively less profitable and pay out less 
cash to their shareholders.  
 
Financial risk is usually measured by financial leverage but there is no consensus in the literature 
about the effect of this measure on corporate governance. According to agency cost view, 
Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that debt financing provides better incentives for managers to 
perform as they aim to avoid the personal costs of bankruptcy. Another view suggests “high-
quality” borrowers have incentives to show their quality (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  Such High –
quality borrowers want to show their performance by applying good corporate governance or 
debt holders may want to see sound corporate governance practices to protect their loan and 
return on risky investment. On the other hand, Pushner (1995), Nickell et al. (1997), Arping and 
Sautner (2010) indicate a negative relationship between corporate governance and financial 
leverage. 
Ownership structure play an important role in corporate governance mechanism, and it is 
often analyzed by focusing on ownership concentration and firm performance (Larner, 1966, 
Short 1994, Holderness, 2003, Denis and Serrano 1996, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and 
ownership identity (Ananchotikul, 2008, Gürsoy and Aydoğan, 2002, Mehran, 1995, Huizinga 
and Denis, 2003, Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Firms operating in poor investor protection 
environments have more concentrated ownership structure La Porta et al, 1996, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986),: When the regulatory quality provıdes enough legal rights to small investors, they 
can invest in small amounts but  In weak regulatory environment, investors or shareholders want 
to keep their enough shares to protect their rights.  Thus, ownership concentration may be seen as 
a substitute for legal protection. Besıdes acting as a substitute, another advantage of ownership 
concentration is the opportunity to shareholders for monitoring managers and this may reduce 
agency cost.   
  A positive effect of family ownership besides family members acting as managers is 
long-term orientation of the family owner. Family-owners acting as managers for a long time 
also tend to develop comparative advantage -through increasing capital and searching for new 
investment opportunities compared to other nonfamily managers aiming for short-term profits. 
Thus we can argue that long-term orientation of the family owner reduces agent cost (Hsu and 
Chen, 2009).  
The private control benefit argument can be considered as a negative effect of family 
ownership structure.  In the case of weak shareholder protection, family owners have more 
opportunities to gain private control by expropriating minority shareholders’ benefits (Chen 
2012, Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This may adversely affect firm’s performance. In the case of 
Turkey, Gürsoy and Aydoğan (2002) find that family owned firms seem to have lower 
performance with lower risk while firms with foreign ownership display better performance. 
Pinto and Leal (2013) show that in another emerging market setting like Brazil, family controlled 
firms tend to pay more to their CEOs and board members when controlling shareholders or their 
relatives act as directors. Schiehll et al. (2011) assert that family controlled firms in Brazil tend 
not to voluntarily disclose their executive stock options plans. 
One of the earlier papers regarding foreign ownership and corporate governance is by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who show that foreign equity investment results in better monitoring 
of company directors and as a result benefits all shareholders. By exercising their voting rights 
foreign investors can force out existing management and put in place more efficient directors. 
The impact of foreign ownership on corporate governance might change as the size of the 
ownership stake changes.  If foreign investors control a sizeable stake in the company, they 
might also act in in their self-interest to exploit minority stake-holders. Known as the 
entrenchment hypothesis, this view suggests that more equity ownership by the foreign industrial 
corporations which take part in active management of the company may worsen financial 
performance since the foreign stake-holder may not consider minority owners’ interests. (Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)).  
  Another view, known as the theory of private benefits of control (Bebchuk, 1999) argues 
that the disincentive of foreign investors to improve corporate governance might be due to the 
fact that they receive potential private benefits with relative ease when corporate governance is 
weak.
6
 
Testing whether either one of these theories hold in practice is an empirical project. 
Although there are studies that have looked at this relationship in developed market economies 
such as [Doidge et al, 2004, Aggerwal et al, 2009, Ammann et al., 2011], research on emerging 
market settings is limited
7
. Ananchotikul (2008) has investigated this linkage in the case of 
Thailand and finds that the impact of foreign ownership on corporate governance is somewhat 
linked to the form of foreign investment. In the case of Thailand, foreign industrial investors do 
not necessarily improve corporate governance while purchases of minority stakes by foreign 
institutional investors lead to improvements. This is an interesting finding and shows to prove 
that the story around foreign ownership and corporate governance is not a clear-cut issue.  
Ananchotikul also illustrates that the origin of foreign owner matters: there may be no 
improvements for firms who have a foreign owner that comes from a country with weak 
governance institutions.  
                                                          
6
 For more discussion on the topic see Ananchotikul (2006).  
7
 For Turkey, Gurbuz et al. (2010) show evidence that institutional investors improve financial performance of 
Turkish firms.  Akman et al. (2011) find foreign ownership has a positive impact on firm performance  consistent 
with Gürsoy and Aydoğan (2002). Xu and Wang (1997) and Claessens (1997) also find evidence suggesting lower 
accounting-based performance, and higher market performances are experienced while the concentration in 
ownership increases in the cases of China, Slovak and Czech Republics. On the contrary, Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) find no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance  
Recently, there has been a proliferation of country-level evidence that the origin of legal 
rules and the quality of their enforcement in a country are good proxies for differences in 
investor protection which, in turn, affects the efficiency of its financial markets and its access to 
foreign capital (see for ex. La Porta et al., 1996, 1997, Schleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002, Gugler et 
al., 2004). Firm-level empirical evidence has corroborated these findings: firms with better 
corporate governance practices have been found to have lower cost of capital (Sengupta, 1998; 
Mazumdar et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al.,2004), lower credit rate spreads (Yu, 2005); higher 
values, profitability, and lower risk (Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2004 and 2005). 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
a. DATA  
 
Our data on corporate governance for Turkish companies comes from Borsa İstanbul 
bulletins, Finnet database and financial reports of firms announced on Public Disclosure 
Platform of Turkey.  Although we started our calculation with 46 companies listed on Borsa 
Istanbul which currently have corporate governance ratings, we excluded firms operating in 
finance sector to prevent data distortion. Our main concern was distortion due to differences in 
firm operating characteristics. We also excluded some outlier observations.
8
 At the end we 
reached 76 firm year observations with 22 firms covering a 6-year time span from 2008 to 2012.
9
 
 
                                                          
8
  Observations that were more than 6 standard deviations away from category means are excluded. In total, 5 year-firm 
observations are dropped.   
9
 Financial institutions including banks and participation banks, insurance companies, financial leasing and factoring companies, 
holding and investment companies, investment trusts, real estate investment trusts, venture capital investment trusts and 
brokerage houses are excluded. 
In terms of ownership structure, Turkish corporations can be characterized as highly 
concentrated, family-owned firms attached to a group of companies generally owned by the same 
family or a group of families. The group usually includes a bank, which does not have significant 
equity ownership in member firms. Very large groups are well-diversified conglomerates 
sometimes with pyramidal structures. Others are usually vertically integrated companies in the 
same line of business. Although professional managers run these companies, family members are 
highly actively involved in strategic as well as daily decisions. (Gürsoy, Aydoğan, 2002) 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. No. Of Obs. 
EPS 0.952692 -0.42 5.85 1.271049 76 
CGR 84.48808 71.2 92.44 4.144718 76 
ROE 15.56423 -38.55 52.16 14.73067 76 
ROA 6.956667 -14.49 26.1 7.080452 76 
FL 51.59962 2.42 84.99 20.02921 76 
OPG 27.17754 -116.66 347.98 83.41217 76 
FOREIGN 14.4641 0 83.75 23.49773 76 
The table shows descriptive statistics for our dataset. EPS stands for earnings per share in 
Turkish Liras, CGR stands for the corporate governance index score assigned by the rater; ROE 
is return on equity measured as percentage points, ROA is return on assets measured as 
percentage points; FL stands for financial leverage calculated as the ratio of liabilities to equity; 
OPG represents growth of Operating Profit in percentage points; FOREIGN is a percentage of 
foreign ownership and FAMILY represents the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
company is controlled by a family.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics on our dataset employed in this paper.
 10
 We define foreign 
ownership if0.5% or more equity is held by a foreign partner. 
11
 In our sample the average is 
14.46%.  . Maximum shares owned by family-owned companies are 77.5% with a mean of 47.92 
% shares. In the sample, government ownership exists for only 2 companies.
12
 
 
b. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
We follow Ananchotikul (2008) in setting up our empirical estimation in evaluating the 
link between foreign ownership and corporate governance in the case of Turkey. Our empirical 
estimation takes the following form:  
          ∑   
 
               
                                                                        
(1) 
where CGRi,t represents the corporate governance rating for firm i at time t; FITCHt is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for periods after 2012 when Turkey received investment grade 
status by Fitch Ratings. We include this variable in our estimations since sovereign rating 
changes have an underlying effect on individual company ratings. FAMILYi,t-1 is a dummy 
variable that represents controlling stake in company i by a family at time t-1. As mentioned 
before Turkish companies can be characterized as highly concentrated, family owned firms 
attached to a group of companies generally owned by the same family or a group of families in 
the form of holding. If the family members have significant voting rights associated with their 
                                                          
10
 Most of the Turkish firms have a complex network of ownership. i.e. Hurriyet operates in manufacturing of paper and paper 
products as well as in printing and publishing sector. Doğan Yayın Holding owns 66% of the company and Doğan Holding owns 
another 11% stake in the company. Doğan Yayın Holding is owned by Doğan Holding and Doğan Holding is owned by Doğan 
family. Keeping Doğan Holding and  Hurriyet  in the sample may cause duplication of data. So holdings in such situations are 
excluded. 
11
 Foreign ownership can be as portfolio investment or direct investment. Joint venture is not common in Turkish Capital 
Market. 
12
Turkish State has shares in Turk Telekom, a telecommunications company and Aselsan, a defense contractor.  
sizeable stake, the dummy takes the value of 1 and otherwise 0. This information is hand 
collected by analyzing board structures of companies and disclosure notes in financial reports.  
CGR reports usually include a section evaluating board of directors, but the classification of 
family management is determined by reading annual financial reports, disclosures and by 
collecting data about family members. FOREIGNi,t-1 represents foreign ownership in percentage 
for firm i at time t-1;             
  is a matrix of control variables for firm i and includes the 
following:   
 Firm’s profitability measured by the following  accounting and market-based ratios:  
o  Earnings per share (EPSi,t-1) in Turkish liras calculated by dividing net income to 
the average number of outstanding shares in the previous reporting period;  
o Return on equity (ROE i,t-1) calculated as the ratio of previous fiscal  year’s net 
income to previous year’s average total equity; 
o Return on assets (ROA i,t-1) calculated by dividing a company’s annual earnings 
by its total assets, expressed as  percentage points and reported by the firm in the 
previous reporting period; 
o Growth of company’s operating profit (OPG) calculated as the change in 
operating profit divided into prior year’s net operating profit.13  
 
 Financial Risk measured by financial leverage ratio (FL i,t-1) calculated as the ratio of 
company’s total debt to its equity in the previous year.  
 
                                                          
13 In year-end financial reports of companies in Turkey, other operating income and other operating expense are also taken into account in profit calculations. For an accurate 
calculation and to indicate performance only about a firm’s operating area we excluded other operating income and expense in our calculations of this variable.  
 
We take a one-period lag of all control variables in our specification since most CGR reporting 
companies rely on previous period’s reports in calculating CGR. We expect a company’s CGR 
reading to be influenced by its risk and profitability. The rationale is higher profits could be a 
sign of excessive risk taking which should lower a firm’s CGR reading or vice versa. In the 
meantime, excessive risk can be identified by the firm’s financial leverage ratio which can have 
an adverse effect on the company’s CGR reading.    
Table 1. Estimation Variables and Expected Signs 
 Variable Abbreviation Expected Sign of the Coefficient 
Macro Variables    
 Upgrade of Turkey’s Credit Rating to Investment 
Grade Status 
FITCH + 
Profitability Measures    
 Earnings Per Share (in TL) EPS + 
 Return on Equity ROE +/- 
 Return on Assets ROA +/- 
 Growth of Operating Profit OPG + 
Risk Measures    
 Financial Leverage FL +/- 
Ownership Structure Variables    
 Foreign ownership FOREIGN ? 
 Family Ownership FAMILY ? 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
This section provides the results of our estimations for equation (1). We perform a two-level 
procedure in our analysis. First we run stepwise static OLS estimations. Before doing so, we 
perform Hausman Test to check for the validity of the fixed effects model. The Χ2 value with 21 
degrees of freedom is 121.63 with a p value that is equal to 0. The p-value strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis that cross-section effects are redundant supporting the use of fixed effects model. 
In order to account for possible persistence in CGR readings, we slightly modify Eq. (1) and 
include a lag of our endogenous variable (CGRt-1). The reason we use a lag of our dependent 
variable on the right hand side is because CGR readings are usually influenced by the previous 
period’s reading, a finding shown with a high correlation between the two variables.14 Previous 
literature has shown that firm structure measures are highly endogenous to CGR estimations.
15  
The solution to endogeneity works if we can find instrumental variables that are correlated with 
the endogenous regressor. When assuming the ownership structure to be endogenous Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (1989) use generalized method of 
moments with a panel of data to remove the simultaneous effect of performance on ownership 
structure and to increase the adequacy of the empirical test. Thus, for the modified versions of 
Eq. (1) we use the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) following the strategy of 
Arellano and Bond (1991). We use all possible lags of our dependent variable plus lagged values 
of our ownership structure, FAMILY variable as instruments. By doing so we obtain parameter 
estimates that are consistent and efficient. We have 18 firms that we can use in our dynamic 
panel GMM model; this increases our confidence in the consistency and efficiency of our 
estimates.  
                                                          
14
 The coefficient of correlation between CGRt and CGRt-1 is 0.86.  
15
 See Larcker, et al (2007), Black (2006) and Ananchotikul (2008). 
Table 3. Estimation Results 
DependentVariable: 
CGRit 
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (2) 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM 
Time Period 2008-
2012 
2008-
2012 
2008-
2012 
2008-
2012 
2008-
2012 
2008-
2012 
2008-
2012 
2008-
2012 
2010-
2013 
          
C 84.61**
* 
(0.57) 
 
84.31**
* 
(0.42) 
84.84**
* 
(0.48) 
84.96**
* 
(0.47) 
80.12**
* 
(2.46) 
80.80**
* 
(2.34) 
82.25**
* 
(2.34) 
81.77**
* 
(2.31) 
 
CGR (-1)         0.26* 
(0.14) 
EPS (-1) 2.41*** 
(0.48) 
1.47*** 
(0.38) 
2.05*** 
(0.46) 
2.18*** 
(0.45) 
2.25*** 
(0.44) 
2.49*** 
(0.43) 
2.44*** 
(0.41) 
2.53*** 
(0.41) 
2.50** 
(1.08) 
FITCH (-1)  4.19*** 
(0.62) 
4.45*** 
(0.61) 
4.40*** 
(0.60) 
4.29*** 
(0.58) 
4.51*** 
(0.56) 
4.58*** 
(0.54) 
4.46*** 
(0.53) 
2.22** 
(0.84) 
ROE (-1)   -0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.19** 
(0.07) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.37** 
(0.15) 
ROA (-1)    0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.25** 
(0.13) 
0.25** 
(0.12) 
0.23** 
(0.12) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.62** 
(0.30) 
FL (-1)     0.09* 
(0.45) 
0.08* 
(0.43) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
OPG (-1)      0.01** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.01** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
FAMILY (-1)       -2.81** 
(1.26) 
-2.94** 
(1.24) 
-2.77*** 
(0.49) 
FOREIGN (-1)        0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
Adj. R
2
 0.51 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.82  
No. of firms 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 18 
No. of observations
 
76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 54 
S.E. of Regression         2.41 
AR (1)         z=-0.085 
p=0.59 
AR(2)         z=-0.109 
p=0.68 
Sargan Test p value         0.49 
Instruments used         CGR, 
FAMIL
Y 
The table shows the results of stepwise estimations for equation (1) using OLS and GMM techniques. All OLS estimations include fixed effects that are not reported here. EPS stands for 
earnings per share in Turkish Liras, FITCH is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 following the upgrade of Turkey’s credit rating to investment-grade status in 2012; ROE is return 
on equity measured as percentage points, ROA is return on assets measured as percentage points; FL stands for financial leverage calculated as the ratio of liabilities to equity; OPG 
represents growth of Operating Profit in percentage points; FAMILY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is controlled by a family; FOREIGN is the percentage of 
foreign ownership * represents significance at 10%, ** represents significance at 5% and *** represents significance at 1%. The null hypothesis for the Sargan Test is the instrumental 
variables are uncorrelated to some set of residuals. The null hypothesis for AR(k) test is there is no autocorrelation up to order k. 
 
The results of our estimations are available in Table 3. We observe that the following 
regressors have a robust effect on CGR readings: earnings per share (EPS), Fitch rating upgrade 
(FITCH), return on equity and assets (ROE and ROA), financial leverage (FL) ratio and family 
control (FAMILY) dummy.  Among our firm specific control variables, earnings per share (EPS) 
increases a firm’s CGR reading as evidenced in both equations. This suggests that firms with 
higher earnings also receive higher corporate governance readings. We also observe that 
profitability is closely linked to CGR scores as illustrated by ROE and ROA coefficients. Both of 
these variables are highly significant in both OLS and GMM estimations yet with opposite signs. 
ROE enters our estimations with a negative sign suggesting that higher returns on equity yield 
lower CGR readings while for ROA we observe the opposite suggesting return on assets is a 
positive contributor to corporate governance. The reason why we might observe a negative sign 
for ROE while a positive sign for ROA could be because firms with low equity could be seen 
more risky by the rating companies and thus be assigned a lower CGR score. Financial leverage 
(FL) which is measured by the ratio of liabilities to equity takes a positive sign and is significant 
in our estimations. This suggests as firms’ liabilities increase relative to their equity their 
corporate governance rating increases. We can explain this result as follows: faster growing 
firms need external capital to sustain growth, and therefore might choose better governance to 
attract investors. The positive and significant sign of FL in our models is an indicator that high–
quality borrowers want to show their performance by applying good corporate governance 
practices. Additionally, we can argue that a contributing factor is the scrutiny the firm is subject 
to as its liability portfolio increases. A significant portion of liabilities for a firm is loans; higher 
loans bring along with more scrutiny towards a firm’s finances and operations by the creditors. 
This may result in highly leveraged firms to behave more conservatively and compliant thus 
receiving higher CGR scores. This finding is in line with previous research (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981) which has demonstrated that debt holders may want to see sound corporate governance 
practices to secure their repayment.    
The dummy variable “FITCH “which takes the value of 1 for 2012 and 0 for previous years 
enters our estimations positively suggesting that Turkey’s rating upgrade was an instrumental 
factor in CGR readings for Turkish firms.  
As predicted by theory (Bebchuk 1999, La Porta et al. 1999 and 2000, Dyck and Zingales, 
2004’ Villalonga and Amit, 2006), founders of firms or their families may need to retain control 
of the firm because the family's reputation is needed to raise external funds when the legal 
protection of outside investors is poor. In our study, however the sign and coefficient of the 
FAMILY variable is negative and does not change in both our OLS and GMM estimations. The 
interpretation is that rating companies may read controlling stakes by a family in a firm’s 
ownership structure as unfavorable conditions in corporate governance. In line with this result 
we also find that ROE has a negative effect on corporate governance. This finding is consistent 
with the private control benefit argument (Chen, 2012): the divergence of voting rights and cash 
flow rights   allows the block holder to gain private benefit because it has high control power and 
low capital involvement.  
Another important finding in our results is the effect of previous period’s CGR reading on 
the current period reading. The high significance of this variable in GMM estimations suggests 
that raters take into consideration previous period’s CGR levels in assigning new CGR scores to 
firms.  
We find the foreign ownership variable (FOREIGN) takes on an expected sign and yet it is 
not highly-significant in our estimations. The positive sign of this variable suggests that foreign 
ownership increases a firm’s CGR scores while the insignificance of this variable in our GMM 
estimations suggests this is not a robust finding. The same can be said for the growth of 
operating profit (OPG) in our estimations. While significant in our OLS estimations and with a 
positive sign, this variable is insignificant in our GMM estimation. A positive sign indicates that 
growth in profits from company’s core operations has a positive effect on its CGR score. This is 
a meaningful and expected result.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Ownership structure, as a mechanism in corporate governance has been believed to effect 
firm performance for many years.  The relationship between ownership structure and corporate 
performance are assumed to exist, because ownership concentration and owner identity influence 
the incentives of each party within the firm, and thus influence the firm’s ability to solve agency 
problems. The conflict of shareholders and management is expected to decrease with good 
corporate governance practices.  Also it is becoming more common for investors to consider 
governance issues when making investment decisions. In response to this interest, several 
organizations now rate the corporate governance practices of public companies, either as a stand-
alone offering or as part of a credit rating. In line with international practices, Turkey’s CMB 
established the Corporate Governance Principles and since 2005 Borsa Istanbul has been listing a 
Corporate Governance Index for Turkish companies. This index was created to expand the 
breadth and significance of corporate governance applications and to promote the voluntary 
compliance.  The index gives firms an opportunity to differentiate themselves by voluntary 
application after the assessment of corporate governance ratings.  In this paper we evaluated the 
impact of ownership structure on Turkish firm’s CGRs. In doing so we compiled data on 22 
publicly traded Turkish companies and their ownership structures. Our estimations suggest that 
family control has a significant and negative impact on Turkish firms CGR scores. This finding 
suggests controlling stakes by a family in a firm’s ownership structure are considered as 
unfavorable conditions. This finding has important policy implications. Weakening of family 
control on Turkish corporations seems to be an important step in improving corporate 
governance in Turkey.  
We also find that financial risk as measured by financial leverage (FL) has a positive 
impact on CGR scores. Faster growing firms with high debt seem to choose better governance to 
attract investors in the Turkish case or debt holders may want to see sound corporate governance 
practices to secure their repayment.    
Foreign ownership seems to improve CGR scores for Turkish companies as shown in our 
research. The origin of foreign ownership in Turkey is mostly from developed countries such as 
the US, Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy and France. For the sample period studied, these 
countries have better corporate governance ranking than Turkey.
16
 According to our results, the 
positive sign of this variable suggests that foreign ownership increases a firm’s CGR and is in 
line with previous research that focused on foreign ownership in Turkish companies. Gürsoy and 
Aydoğan (2002) and Akman et al. (2011) find foreign ownership has a positive impact on market 
performance.  On the other hand the insignificance of this variable in our GMM estimations 
suggests this is not a robust finding.  
Our study has valuable contribution to literature on corporate governance in emerging 
market settings and is expected to be of interest to regulators, researchers, managers and market 
participants.  As of 2014 only eight countries have corporate governance indices and only three 
are applying voluntary application. Further research may focus on cross-sectional analysis of 
                                                          
16
 The World Bank Governance Index is available at  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators. Only Lebanon has ranked below Turkey.  
ownership structure and especially on family control of corporate boards in other emerging 
market cases to see whether our results hold.  
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Abdullah, A. & Page, M., 2009. “Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: UK 
FTSE 350 Companies”, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland. 
 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R., Williamson, R., 2009. “Differences in governance practice 
between U.S. and foreign firms: measurement, causes, and consequences”, Review of 
Financial Studies, 22, 3131-3169. 
 
Akman, N.H., Mugan, C.S.& Akisik, O., 2011. “Ownership structure effect on firm 
performance: evidence from an emerging market”, working paper presented at the 8th 
International Accounting Conference Corporate Governance and Control, 20-22 October 
2011, Izmir University of Economics Conference Hall, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Ammann, M., Oesch, D., Schmid, M., 2011. “Corporate governance and firm value: 
international evidence”,  Journal of Empirical Finance, 18(1), 36-55. 
 
Ananchotikul, N., 2008. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Really Improve Corporate 
Governance?”,  Evidence from Thailand. Bank of Thailand Discussion Paper. 
 
Ananchotikul, S., Eichengreen, B., 2009. “Corporate governance reform in emerging 
markets: How much, why, and with what effects?”, Journal of The Japanese and 
International Economies, 23, 149-176. 
 
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. “Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 
277-297. 
 
Arping, S., Sautner, Z., 2010. “Corporate governance and leverage: Evidence from a natural 
experiment”, Finance Research Letters, 7(2), 127-134. 
 
Ashbaugh, H., Collins, D.W., LaFond, R., 2004. “Corporate Governance and the Cost of 
Equity Capital”, Working Paper. 
 
Bebchuk, L., Kraakman, R., G. Triantis, 1999. “Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual 
Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights”, 
Discussion Paper #249, Harvard Law Scholl. 
 
Black, B.S., Jang, H., Kim, W., 2006. “Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market 
Values? Evidence from Korea”, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 22(2). 
 
Brown, L.D., and Caylor, M.L., 2005. “Corporate governance and firm performance”, The 
Accounting Review, 80(2), 423-440. 
 
Brown, L.D., Caylor, M.L., 2009. “Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance”, 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 32(2), 129-144. 
 
Chen, J., 2012. “Special Issue: Corporate finance and corporate governance in contemporary 
China”, Journal of Chinese economic and business studies, 2, 109-207. 
 
Cho, M.H., 1998. “Ownership structure, investment, and corporate value: an empirical 
analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 103-121. 
 
Claessens, S., 1997. “ Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: Evidence from the Czech and 
Slovak Republics”, Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, 52(4), 1641-58. 
Core, J., Guay, W., Rusticus, T., 2005. “Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An 
examination of firm performance and analysts’ expectation”,  Working  Paper, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Corporate Govarnance Principles, 2003. Capital Markets Board of Turkey, 
http://www.cmb.gov.tr/regulations/files/corporate_governance.pdf, accessed on 
15/08/2014. 
  
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 
 
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. “Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance”, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, 209-233. 
 
Denis, D.J., Serrano, J.M., 1996. “Active investors and management turnover following 
unsuccessful control contests”, Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 239. 
 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., Stulz, R., 2004. “Why are foreign firms listed in the US worth 
more?”, Journal of Financial Economics 71, 205-238. 
 
Dyck, A., Zingales, L., 2004. “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison”, 
Journal of Finance. 
 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A., 2003. “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-155. 
 
Grimminger, A.D.,  Di Benedetta, P., 2013. “Raising the Bar on Corporate Governance: A 
Study of Eight Stock Exchange Indices”, World Bank and the International Financial 
Corporation, Washington, DC. 
 
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O., 1982. “Corporate financial structure and managerial incentive”, 
in J. McCall, ed.: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
 
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C., Yurtoglu, B.B., 2004. “Corporate Governance And The Return On 
Investment”, Journal of Law and Economics, 47. 
 
Gursoy, G., Aydogan, K., 2002. “Equity Ownership, Risk Taking and Performance: An 
Empirical Investigation in Turkish Listed Companies”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 
38(6), 6-25. 
 
Gürbüz A. O., Aybars, A., Kutlu, Ö., 2010. “Corporate Governance and Financial Performance 
with a Perspective on Institutional Ownership: Empirical Evidence from Turkey”, Journal of 
Applied Management Accounting Research, 8(2), 21-37. 
 
Hartzell, J.C., Starks, L.T., 2003. “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation”, 
Journal of Finance 5S, 2351-2374. 
 
Hermalin, B., Michael W., 1989. “The Determinants of board composition”, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 19, 589-606. 
 
Holderness, C.G.G., 2003. “A Survey Of Blockholders And Corporate Control”, Economic 
Policy Review, 9(1), 51-63. 
 
Hsu, C.Y., Chen, Y.L., Lin, W.Y., 2009. “Corporate governance and credit risk”, NTU 
Management Review,  19(S-2),  71-98. 
 
Huizinga, H., Denis, C., 2003. “Are foreign ownership and good institutions substitutes?”, 
The European evidence, mimeo, European Commission, Brussels. 
 
La Porta, R., Silanes, F.L., Shleifer, A., 1999. “Corporate ownership around the World”, 
Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517. 
 
La Porta, R., Silanes, F.L., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. “Investor protection and corporate 
Governance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27. 
 
La Porta, R., Silanes, F.L., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1996. “Law and Finance”, Harvard 
Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic 
Research. 
 
La Porta, R., Silanes, F.L., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. “Legal Determinants of External 
Finance”,  Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, 52(3), 1131-50. 
 
Larcker, D.F., Richardson, S.A., Tuna, I., 2007. “Corporate Governance, Accounting 
Outcomes, and Organizational Performance”, 82(4), 963-1008. 
 
Larner, R. J., 1966. “Ownership and control in the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations, 
1929 and 1963”, The American Economic Review, 56(4), 777-787. 
 
Mashayekhi, B., Bazaz, M.S., 2008. “Corporate Govarnance and Firm Performance in 
Iran(Unpublished master’s thesis)”, University of Tehran and Oakland University, Iran. 
 
Mazumdar, S.C., Sarin, A., Sengupta, P., 2002. “To tell or not to tell: the value of corporate 
disclosure”, Working paper, Santa Clara University. 
 
Mehran, H., 1995. “Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 163−184. 
 
Nickell, S., Nicolitsas, D., Dryden, N., 1997. “What makes firms perform well?”, European 
Economic Review, Elsevier, 41(3-5), 783-796. 
 
Pinto, M. B., Leal, R.P.C., 2013. “Ownership concentration, top management and board 
compensation”,  Revista de Administracao Contemporanea, 17(3), 304-324. 
 
 
Pushner, G. M., 1995. “Equity ownership structure, leverage, and productivity: Empirical 
evidence from Japan”,  Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, 3(2-3), 241-255. 
 Sami, H., Wang, J. and Zhou, H., 2011. “Corporate governance and operating performance 
of  Chinese listed firms”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 20(2), 
106-114. 
 
Schiehll, E., Terra, P.R., Victor, F. G. (forthcoming), 2011. “Determinants of voluntary 
executive stock option disclosure in Brazil”, Journal of Management and Governance.  
 
Sengupta, P., 1998. “Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt”, The Accounting 
Review, 73(4), 459-474. 
 
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, 1997, “A survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance 
LII, 737−783. 
 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1986. “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 94, 461−488. 
 
Shleifer, A., Wolfenzon, D., 2002. “Investor protection and equity markets”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Elsevier, 66(1), 3-27. 
 
Short, H., 1994. “Ownershıp, Control, Fınancıal Structure And The Performance Of Fırms”, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 8(3), 203. 
 
Stiglitz, J., Weiss, A., 1981. ”Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, The 
American Economic Review, 71(3), 393-410. 
 
Villalonga, B., Amit, R., 2006. “How do family ownership, control and management affect 
firm value?”,  Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 385–417. 
 
Wu, S., Cui, H., 2002. “Consequences of the concentrated ownership structure in Mainland 
China – Evidence of year 2000”,Working paper, City University of Hong Kong. 
 Xu, X., Wang, Y., 1997. “Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate 
Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies”, Working Paper, World Bank. 
 
Yu, F., 2005. “Accounting Transparency and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 75, 53-84. 
 
